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In January 1995, the California Supreme Court issued an opinion that 
had the impact of a bombshell on California securities fraud prosecu-
tions. In People v. Simon, California's Supreme Court overturned a 
Lutheran minister's criminal conviction for securities fraud. 1 The court 
based its decision on jury instructions it considered inappropriate. The 
instructions stated that neither "guilty knowledge" nor "criminal intent" 
* On April 3, I 996, the Honorable John G. Davies of the United States District 
Court of the Central District of California granted a writ of habeas corpus to Charles H. 
Keating, Jr., effectively overturning his conviction for violations of Corporations Code 
section 25401. Keating v. Hood, 922 F. Supp. 1482 (1996). Applying Simon to the 
instructions given the Keating jury, Judge Davies found a denial of due process in the 
failure to determine the appropriate intent required to convict the defendant as either a 
direct perpetrator or an aider and abettor. Id. at 1486, 1493. 
* George A. Crawford and Natalie C. Roberts are lawyers with the Enforcement 
Division of the California Department of Corporations. During preparation of this 
article, Shawn J. Nelson served as an intern with the Department of Corporations and 
was in his second year at Loyola Law School. 
The opinions stated herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the 
California Commissioner or the Department of Corporations. 
Appreciation is also expressed for the review and suggestions of Mr. Richard 
Lowenstein, Esq. of the Major Frauds Division for the Los Angeles County District 
Attorney's Office. 
I. 9 Cal. 4th 493, 886 P.2d 1271, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 278 (1995). Noting that 
different jury instructions could have led to a finding that there had been a preexisting 
relationship sufficient to warrant an exemption, the court also overturned Simon's 
conviction for the sale of unqualified securities. 
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was required for a criminal conviction under Corporations Code section 
25401, California's anti-fraud provision.2 
California's appellate decisions have played a major role for years in 
the development and interpretation of securities law throughout the 
country. It is uncertain, therefore, whether Simon portends a nationwide 
trend or is merely an aberratiofr--Or realignment---of California law. 
Nonetheless, the case raises the question whether criminal prosecution 
is still a viable tool for enforcing California's anti-fraud provision.3 
In the opinion of the authors, criminal prosecution for securities fraud 
is still "alive and well" both in California and throughout the country. 
Simon should best be read as a "common sense" realignment of 
California case law limited to prosecutions for violations of section 
2540 I. With minor modifications of jury instructions, pleadings, and 
memoranda of points and authorities, it is expected that prosecutors will 
continue to obtain criminal convictions for violations of section 2540 I. 
I. CALIFORNIA'S CRIMINAL LIABILITY STATUTE 
In a manner similar to section 604 of the Uniform Securities Act, 
California Corporations Code 255404 provides criminal sanctions for the 
2. Section 25401 provides: 
It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell a security in this state or buy or offer 
to buy a security in this state by means of any written or oral communication which 
includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading. 
CAL. CORP. CODE§ 25401 (West 1977). 
Section 25401 is very similar to § 50 I of the Uniform Securities Act, which states: 
In connection with an offer to sell, sale, offer to purchase, or purchase, of a 
security, a person may not, directly or indirectly: 
(I) employ a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; 
(2) make an untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made not misleading, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they are made; or 
(3) engage in an act, practice, or course of business that operates or would operate 
as a fraud or deceit upon a person. 
UNIF. SEC. ACT§ 501, 7B U.L.A. 138 (Supp. 1996). 
3. Simon may prove to be the last word on the subject for quite some time from 
the California Supreme Court. It had been anticipated that the court would consider 
some or all of the issues raised in Simon in response to Charles H. Keating's petition for 
review of his criminal conviction. However, on March 23, 1995, the California Supreme 
Court dismissed Keating's petition. People v. Keating, 890 P.2d 1119, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
410 (Cal. 1995). 
4. Allowing for punishment either as a felony or misdemeanor, § 25540 states 
that: 
(a) Except as provided for in subdivision (b), any person who willfully 
violates any provision of this division [the Corporate Securities Law of I 968), 
or who willfully violates any rule or order under this division, shall upon 
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"willful" violation of any provision of California's Corporate Securities 
Law of 1968 (CSL).5 All CSL violations subject to criminal sanctions 
have one thing in common: The District Attorney must show that the 
defendant acted "willfully." Thus, a finding of "willful" behavior has 
been the key to criminal prosecution under the CSL. 
Section 7(1) of the California Penal Code defines "willfully." 
The word "willfully," when applied to the intent with which an act is done 
or omitted, implies simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act, or make 
conv1ct10n be fined not more than one million dollars ($1,000,000), or 
imprisoned in the state prison, or in a county jail for not more than one year, 
or be punished by both such fine and imprisonment; but no person may be 
imprisoned for the violation of any rule or order if he or she proves that he or 
she had no knowledge of the rule or order. 
(b) Any person who willfully violates Section 25400, 25401, or 25402, or 
who willfully violates any rule or order under this division adopted pursuant 
to those provisions, shall upon conviction be fined not more than ten million 
dollars ($10,000,000), or imprisoned in the state prison for two, three, or five 
years, or be punished by both such fine and imprisonment. 
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25540 (West Supp. 1996). 
Similarly, § 604 of the Uniform Securities Act states, in relevant part: 
(a) A person who willfully violates a provision of this [Act], except Section 
504, or a rule of the [Administrator] under this [Act], or who violates Section 
504, knowing the statement made to be false or misleading in any material 
respect, is guilty of a [insert the language for felony under applicable state 
law]. 
( c) A person convicted of violating a rule or order under this [ Act] may be 
fined, but may not be imprisoned, if the person proves lack of knowledge of 
the rule or order. 
UNIF. SEC. ACT§ 604, 7B U.L.A. 145 (Supp. 1996) (brackets in original). 
This provision and the comments analyzing it have been cited and applied frequently 
in decisions throughout the country, referring to the pre-1985 number of the provision, 
section 409. See, e.g., State v. Bilbrey, 349 N.W.2d 1, 3 (N.D. 1984); People v. Blair, 
579 P.2d 1133, 1139 (Colo. 1978); State v. Hodge, 460 P.2d 596, 604 (Kan. 1969); 
Buffo v. State, 415 So. 2d, 1158, 1165 (Ala. 1969); Commonwealth v. Jones, [1978-1981 
Transfer Binder] Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) ,r 71,550, at 68,854 (Pa. C. Apr. 24, 1980). 
In prohibiting "false filings," § 504 of the Uniform Act expressly incorporates a 
requirement of knowledge: 
A person may not make or cause to be made, in a document filed with the 
[Administrator] or in a proceeding under this [Act], a statement that the person 
knows or has reasonable grounds to know is, at the time and in the light of the 
circumstances under which it is made, false or misleading in a material 
respect. 
UNIF. SEC. ACT§ 504, 7B U.L.A. 141 (Supp. 1996) (brackets in original). 
5. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25000-25804 (West Supp. 1996). 
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the omission referred to. It does not require any intent to violate law, or to 
injure another, or to acquire any advantage.' 
That definition is incorporated into the jury instruction given in number 
1.20 of California Jury Instructions Criminal (CALllC).7 A similar 
definition appears at section 212, comment 4, of the Uniform Securities 
Act.8 
The concept of "willfulness" has both an express volitional aspect and 
an implicit cognitive aspect. In a manner somewhat reminiscent of the 
M'Naghten Rule,9 the perpetrator must know the nature and quality of 
the act, otherwise he or she cannot be said logically to have had the 
"purpose or willingness to commit the act." While a "mistake of fact" 
may prove to be a defense, a "mistake of law" is not. 1° California 
Penal Code section 26 is in accord. 11 
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 7(1) (West 1988). 
7. CALJIC No. 1.20 states: 
The word "willfully" when applied to the intent with which an act is done 
or omitted means with a purpose or willingness to commit the act or to make 
the omission in question. The word "willfully" does not require any intent to 
violate the law, or to injure another, or to acquire any advantage. 
I CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRJMINAL No. 1.20 (Arnold Levin ed., 5th ed. 1988). 
8. As the federal courts and the Securities and Exchange Commission have 
construed the term "willfully" in Section l 5(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, all that is required is proof that the person acted intentionally in the 
sense that the person was aware of what he or she was doing. 
UNIF. SEC. ACT§ 212 cmt. 4, 7B U.L.A. 114 (Supp. 1996). 
9. The M'Naghten rule requires that a defendant "be able to both know and 
understand the nature and quality of his act and to distinguish between right and wrong 
at the time of the commission of the offense" before that defendant can be criminally 
responsible for his action. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (6th ed. 1990) (citing 
People v. Crosier, 41 Cal. App. 3d 712, 716, 116 Cal. Rptr. 467, 471 (1974)). 
I 0. By way of example, a mistake of law as to the requirement for qualification 
of a particular security would be no defense. A mistake of fact as to the identity of a 
purchaser of a security would probably not constitute a defense to a charge of the 
unqualified sale of a security, but a valid mistake-of-fact defense conceivably could be 
found in the "good faith" reliance of a salesperson on his supervisor's written assurance 
that the securities had been qualified. As for the fraudulent sale of securities, a 
reasonable and non-negligent mistake of fact would also be a defense. For example, 
provided he had demonstrated suitable diligence in attempting to determine the pertinent 
facts, the promoter of a mining venture reasonably mistaken as to the amount of gold 
ore in the company's mine would presumably have a valid defense. 
11. Section 26 provides: 
All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the 
following classes: 
... Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged under an 
ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent. 
... Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged through 
misfortune or by accident, when it appears that there was no evil design, 
intention, or culpable negligence. 
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In general, California courts have remained true to the definition of 
"willful" given in Penal Code section 7(1) and comment 4 to section 212 
of the Uniform Securities Act. In People v. Clem 12 the defendants were 
charged under section 25540 with willfully violating Corporations Code 
section 25110, which prohibits the offer or sale of unqualified securi-
ties.13 The court of appeal upheld the conviction, stating that the term 
"willful" calls only for proof that the person acted intentionally and 
concluded that the defendants were properly convicted even though they 
may not have possessed any criminal intent. 14 The inaccurate advice 
of counsel concerning the CSL was held to be an invalid defense. Other 
California cases are in accord. 15 
II. PRE-SIMON "WILLFUL" VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 25401 
In 1989 and 1990, however, California's appellate courts issued two 
decisions which appeared to delete the cognitive aspect of "willfulness" 
from the elements of a criminal prosecution for securities fraud. 
In People v. Johnson, the defendant told investors that their investment 
in any of four medical centers would not be used to support the other 
medical centers. 16 When it became apparent that some of the centers 
needed additional capital, the defendant moved funds between the 
centers as needed. Eventually all but one of the centers failed, and many 
investors lost their investments. After the trial court instructed the jury 
based on Penal Code section 7(1 )'s definition of "willfully," the 
defendant was convicted of willfully selling securities by means of a 
false statement even though he did not know at the time of solicitation 
that his statement was or would become false. The defendant appealed, 
squarely presenting the court of appeal with the question of what mens 
rea was required to convict for a violation of section 25401. 
The court of appeal conclusively dismissed the requirement of guilty 
knowledge for a section 25401 violation by stating, 
CAL. PENAL CODE§ 26 (West 1988). 
12. 39 Cal. App. 3d 539, 114 Cal.Rptr. 359 (1974). 
13. CAL. CORP. CODE§ 25110 (West 1977). 
14. Clem, 39 Cal. App. 3d at 541-42, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 361. 
15. See, e.g., Boags v. Municipal Court, 197 Cal. App. 3d 65, 242 Cal.Rptr. 681 
(1987); People v. Gonda, 138 Cal. App. 3d 774, 188 Cal.Rptr. 295 (1982); People v. 
Williams, 102 Cal. App. 3d 1018, 162 Cal.Rptr. 748 (1980). 
16. 213 Cal. App. 3d 1369, 262 Cal.Rptr. 366 (1989). 
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It is settled that the omission of "knowingly" from a penal statute indicates 
that guilty knowledge is not an element of the offense. Had the Legislature 
intended to require proof of guilty knowledge or scienter under section 25540, 
it could have so stated by using the word "knowingly."17 
The court went on to hold that, although in most section 25401 
violations the defendant did in fact know of the material misrepresenta-
tion or omission or acted in reckless disregard for the truth, "[t]he statute 
... does not require the prosecutor to prove the defendant's specific 
intent or knowledge at the time representation is made."18 Thus, the 
court stretched its reasoning to hold that even when, as in Johnson, the 
defendant makes a statement that is true at the time he makes it, his 
subsequent acts contradicting the statement may cause that statement to 
be a material misrepresentation in violation of section 25401. 19 
Harold Marsh and Robert Volk, two of the drafters of the CSL,20 
were unflinchingly critical of Johnson. They referred to the court's 
interpretation of legislative intent as "purely fictional."21 Marsh and 
Volk were especially critical of the holding that, what they considered 
to be in essence, a breach of contract could be a criminal violation of 
section 25401, calling it "totally unwarranted."22 
Nevertheless, in People v. Baumgarf3 the court of appeal seemingly 
reaffirmed Johnson. The court held that section 25401 violations were 
"strict liability"24 crimes.25 The Baumgart court, however, attempted 
17. Id. at 1375, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 369 (citation omitted); see also People v. Kuhn, 
216 Cal. App. 2d 695, 31 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1963). 
18. Johnson, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1375, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 369. 
19. Id. "To put it another way, section 25401 requires [a seller] to keep his 
promises." Id. This sentence inexcusably blurs the distinction between "breach of 
contract" and "fraud." 
20. Commissioner Volk motivated the 1968 revision of California securities law, 
and Professor Marsh reported for the drafting committee. Brian R. Van Camp, 
Introduction to the Revised Edition of HAROLD MARSH, JR. & ROBERT H. VOLK, 
PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA SECURITIES LAWS at xvii (rev. ed. 1996). 
21. People v. Simon, 9 Cal. 4th 493, 513, 886 P.2d 1271, 1285, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
278, 291 (1995). 
22. Id. 
23. 218 Cal. App. 3d 1207, 267 Cal.Rptr. 534 (1990). 
24. In the opinion of the authors, a factor contributing to the current impact of the 
Simon decision has been a relative overuse of the terms "strict liability," "general intent," 
and "specific intent." There is an apparent lack of consensus as to the meaning of the 
terms; individuals will often mean different things while using the same words. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "strict liability" crimes as: "Unlawful acts whose 
elements do not contain the need for criminal intent or mens rea. These crimes are 
usually acts that endanger the public welfare, such as illegal dumping of toxic wastes." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1422 (6th ed. 1990). 
Black's further defines "general intent." "In criminal law, the intent to do that which 
the law prohibits. It is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the defendant 
intended the precise harm or the precise result which eventuated." Id. at 810. 
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to create a basis for its decision that was independent of Johnson. The 
court cited People v. Gonda26 for the proposition that Penal Code 
section 7(1 )'s definition of "willfully" does not require any intent to 
violate the law or injure another and that, where a "statute requires a 
'willful' violation, public welfare offenses ... are punishable without 
proof of criminal intent."27 Likewise, the Baumgart court relied on the 
reasoning in Clem that the California Legislature intended to apply 
"strict liability" to CSL violations. 28 However, Clem deals with 
violations of section 2511 O, and, in order to apply strict liability to 
section 25401, the Baumgart court was forced to rely on Johnson.29 
"Specific intent" is initially defined as: "In criminal law, the intent to accomplish the 
precise act which the law prohibits; e.g. assault with intent to rape." Id. 
A further definition is: 
The mental purpose to accomplish a specific act prohibited by law. The most 
common usage of "specific intent" is to designate a special mental element 
which is required above and beyond any mental state required with respect to 
the actus reus of the crime. Common law larceny, for example, requires the 
taking and carrying away of the property of another, and the defendant's 
mental state as to this act must be established, but in addition it must be 
shown that there was an "intent to steal" the property. Similarly, common law 
burglary requires a breaking and entry into the dwelling of another, but in 
addition to the mental state connected with these acts it must also be 
established that the defendant acted "with intent to commit a felony therein." 
The subjective desire or knowledge that the prohibited result will occur. 
Id. at 1399. 
Finally, Black's defines "specific intent crime" as: "Crime in which defendant must 
not only intend the act charged, but also intend to violate law. One in which a particular 
intent is a necessary element of the crime itself." Id. ( citation omitted). 
In a very insightful comment, the Colorado Supreme Court stated: 
With regard to these securities law violations the use of the term "specific 
intent" confuses matters and adds little or nothing productive or illuminating. 
Thus, we disapprove of its use in securities cases and indicate that in the 
future instructions given in section 11-51-124 cases are to be phrased only in 
tenns of "knowingly," "willfully," and "aware." 
People v. Blair, 579 P.2d 1133, 1139 (Colo. 1978) (citation omitted). 
The authors agree with this comment from the Colorado Supreme Court. Applying 
the concepts of "strict liability," "general intent," and "specific intent" to the criminal 
prosecution of securities fraud is somewhat like the proverbial pounding of square pegs 
into round holes. The authors are deliberately avoiding use of these terms, considering 
it preferable to focus on the question of exactly what "guilty knowledge" is required by 
Simon and the concept of "willfulness." 
25. Baumgart, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1219-20, 267 Cal. Rptr at 540-41. 
26. 138 Cal. App. 3d 774, 188 Cal. Rptr. 295 (1982) 
27. Baumgart, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 1219, 267 Cal.Rptr. at 540 (quoting Gonda). 
28. Id. at 1219, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 540. 
29. Id. 
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Thus, prior to Simon, the landscape facing criminal prosecutions of the 
CSL was very hospitable. Baumgart and Johnson gave the impression 
that prosecutors only had to show that the defendant did the act the CSL 
defined as unlawful. However, as Simon would demonstrate, this ease 
of prosecution was too good to be true. Securities regulators are fond 
of reminding the public that, "If it sounds too good to be true, it 
probably is." In this case, it certainly was. 
III. PEOPLE V. SIMON 
A. Facts 
The defendant, Reverend John M. Simon, was charged with multiple 
counts of having violated section 25401.30 At trial, the court issued the 
following jury instructions in keeping with Johnson and Baumgart: 
(I) The defendant's intent or knowledge at the time of the misrepresentation is 
irrelevant; 
(2) Only a "general intent," not a "specific intent," is required; and 
(3) If later events make the statement untrue, section 25401 is violated.31 
The jury found the defendant guilty. He appealed, contending that 
violations of section 25401 require some sort of "guilty knowledge." 
The California Supreme Court took the extraordinary step of hearing the 
appeal directly from the trial court. 32 
B. Holding 
The court overturned Simon's conviction, concluding that Johnson had 
wrongly determined that "guilty knowledge" was not required for a 
section 25401 criminal conviction.33 
Allowing for a "knew or should-have-known" standard, the court 
stated its holding as follows: 
30. The charges were based on extensive findings by the California Department 
of Corporations (DOC) and the securities fraud receiver appointed at the request of the 
DOC over Simon's Vesper Corporation doing business as Clergy Tax and Financial 
Services. People v. Vesper Corp., No. C 632677 (L.A.S.C.). The injunctive action 
against Vesper and the subsequent referral for criminal prosecution were both brought 
by one of the authors of this article, who remains convinced that Simon could have been 
convicted of multiple counts of securities fraud even with the more stringent standard 
adopted by the California Supreme Court. 
3 I. See People v. Simon, 9 Cal. 4th 493, 498-99, 886 P.2d 1271, 1274, 37 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 278, 281 (1995). 
32. Id. at 496 n.2, 886 P.2d at 1273 n.2, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 279 n.2. 
33. Id. at 509, 886 P.2d at 1281, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 288. 
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We conclude therefore that knowledge of the falsity or misleading nature of 
a statement or of the materiality of an omission, or criminal negligence in 
failing to investigate and discover them, are elements of the criminal offense 
described in section 2540 I. 34 
The court also restated this holding more narrowly to overrule the idea 
that subsequent acts contrary to a statement can cause a statement to 
become a material misrepresentation: 
[F]or purposes of criminal liability, unless an issuer is aware or should have 
been aware at the time of the sale that a material representation is untrue, or 
knew or should have known that an unstated fact was material, he has not sold 
the security by means of an untrue statement of a material fact or omission to 
state a material fact within the meaning of section 2540 I. The truth or falsity 
of a representation and the materiality of an omission must be determined on 
the basis of what the seller knew or should have known at the time of the 
sale." 
Thus, a criminal conviction for a "willful" violation of section 25401 
will require a showing of a cognitive state such that the perpetrator knew 
or should have known:36 (a) that a misrepresentation had been made to 
34. Id. at 522, 886 P.2d at 1290-91, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 296 (emphasis added). 
35. Id. at 523, 886 P.2d at 1291, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 297 (emphasis added). 
It should be noted that while Simon overturns a fraud conviction based on 
nondisclosed commingling of funds between partnerships, the key to the California 
Supreme Court's action is not so much the commingling as the fact that the defendant 
was not shown to have known at the time the investors were solicited that the funds 
would need to be commingled. Simon leaves open the possibility of a section 25401 
conviction for nondisclosed commingling where a pattern or history of such commin-
gling exists within the company or business at the time of solicitation and it is at least 
probable that the investor's funds will be commingled. In such a case, the promoter 
could easily be found to know---0r that he should have known-of the true state of facts 
at the time of solicitation. The nondisclosure of the ongoing commingling of investor 
fund1r-and the probable future commingling of the solicited investor's fund1r-ean and 
should be reasonably expected to be something that a "reasonable investor" would 
consider "material," i.e., something he or she would consider in deciding whether to 
invest. 
36. The court's use of the phrases "criminal negligence" and "knew or should have 
known" is somewhat ambiguous as to the degree of negligence that will be sufficient for 
a criminal conviction. Using terminology unsuited to the consequences of economic 
crime, CALJIC 3.36 defines "criminal negligence" as: 
[C]onduct which is more than ordinary negligence. Ordinary negligence is the 
failure to exercise ordinary or reasonable care. 
["Criminal negligence"] ... refers to [a] negligent act[s] which [is] ... 
aggravated, reckless and gross and which [is] ... such a departure from what 
would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent, careful person under the same 
circumstances as to be contrary to a proper regard for [human life] [ danger to 
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a prospective investor; and (b) of the falsity and "materiality" of the 
misrepresentation; or (c) that an omission had been made to a prospec-
tive investor; and (d) that the omitted information was "material."37 
When the reader probes beyond the terminology and into the state of 
mind actually required, state statutes and case law throughout the 
majority of the United States are clearly in accord with Simon.38 
The authors believe that nearly all of the criminal convictions 
historically obtained for violations of the CSL-and virtually all of the 
cases which have been or will be referred for prosecution, including 
Simon39-have involved and will continue to involve individuals who 
knew or reasonably should have known that misrepresentations or 
omissions of material fact had occurred. 
C. What Simon Does Not Do 
It is important to recognize what Simon does not do. First, Simon 
does not impede either administrative enforcement actions by the DOC 
pursuant to Corporations Code section 25532 or civil enforcement 
human life] or to constitute indifference to the consequences of such act[s]. 
The facts must be such that the consequences of the negligent act[ s) could 
reasonably have been foreseen and it must appear that the [death) [danger to 
human life) was not the result of inattention, mistaken judgement or 
misadventure but the natural and probable result of an aggravated, reckless or 
grossly negligent act. 
CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL, supra note 7, No. 3.36 (brackets in 
original). 
The court's use of the phrase "knew or should have known" seems to imply that 
something less than the state of mind described in CALJIC 3.36 will be required. 
However, prosecutors should take pains to demonstrate the egregiousness of the 
promoter's disregard of specific facts which he or she "should have known." 
37. See Simon, 9 Cal. 4th at 523, 886 P.2d at 1291, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 297. It 
should be recalled that "materiality" is based on whether a "reasonable prospective 
investor" would consider the information significant in deciding whether to invest. See 
Insurance Underwriters Clearing House, Inc. v. Natomas Co., 184 Cal.App. 3d 1520, 
1526, 228 Cal.Rptr. 449, 453 (1986). 
38. People v. Whitlow, 433 N.E.2d 629 (Ill. 1982); People v. Blair, 579 P.2d 1133 
(Colo. 1978) (upholding jury instruction regarding securities fraud that recognized 
knowledge of pertinent facts as an essential part of "willful" conduct and further 
recognizing that the defendant need not intend to violate the law in order to be 
criminally liable); State v. Jacobs, 637 P.2d 1377 (Or. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Burrow, 
474 P.2d 849 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970) (upholding jury instruction concerning the sale of 
unregistered securities that stated that lack of knowledge of unlawfulness was no defense 
when conduct was voluntary). 
39. As noted supra note 31, the Los Angeles County Superior Court previously 
permanently enjoined Reverend Simon from violating section 25401 and placed the 
assets of his company under receivership. The specific violations alleged in the criminal 
complaint were discovered during the receivership. Those violations were so egregious 
that, in the opinion of the DOC, Simon clearly knew or should have known of the 
misrepresentations or the omissions and their materiality. 
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actions pursuant to section 25530(a) for injunctions and section 25535 
for civil penalties. The court reasoned that administrative and civil 
enforcement actions are designed to protect the public. The defendant's 
state of mind in making a sales pitch is irrelevant to the protection of the 
public from misleading sales pitches.4° Citing sections 25530 and 
25535, the court went so far as to state: 
An enforcement action by the commissioner to enjoin future sales by means 
of false or misleading statements is designed to protect the public .... For that 
reason, it is irrelevant that the defendant knows that the statements or omissions 
are false or misleading. In light of the language of section 25401, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the Legislature did not intend to permit members 
of the public to be harmed by such sales simply because the offeror was 
unaware that his or her sales pitch was misleading. The relatively small civil 
penalty authorized implies that administrative enforcement of section 2540 I was 
permissible regardless of whether a violation ... of that section was a knowing 
violation.41 
Therefore, civil injunctions and civil penalties can still be sought and 
imposed by the superior court regardless of what the defendant knew or 
should have known. 
Second, Simon does not alter private civil actions brought by injured 
investors pursuant to section 25501 42 for violations of section 25401. 
The court found that these actions supplement the administrative actions 
and are designed to deter fraud and encourage full disclosure of 
information in securities transactions. The court read the language of 
section 2550 I to allow the injured investor to recover damages only if 
the offeror was aware, or with reasonable care should have been aware, 
of the misleading nature of his statements. Therefore, as before, an 
injured investor must demonstrate that the offeror knew or should have 
known that his statements were misleading.43 
40. Simon, 9 Cal. 4th at 515-16; 886 P.2d at 1286, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 292. 
41. Id. ( citations omitted). 
42. Section 2550 I provides in pertinent part: 
Any person who violates Section 2540 I shall be liable to the person who 
purchases a security from him or sells a security to him, who may sue either 
for rescission or for damages (if the plaintiff or the defendant, as the case may 
be, no longer owns the security), unless the defendant proves that the plaintiff 
knew the facts concerning the untruth or omission or that the defendant 
exercised reasonable care and did not know ( or if he had exercised reasonable 
care would not have known) of the untruth or omission. 
CAL. CORP. CODE § 2550 I (West 1977). 
43. Simon, 9 Cal. 4th at 516, 886 P.2d at 1287, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 293. 
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Third, Simon does not significantly affect the responsibility of the 
prosecution in situations where criminal liability is essentially vicarious, 
i.e., for the conduct of another.44 This is increasingly important due to 
the tendency of securities fraud promoters to insulate themselves by 
delegating the actual contact with investors to a relatively ignorant sales 
force. California case law has historically recognized such promoters as 
criminally culpable.45 
In pre-trial proceedings during the prosecution of Charles H. Keating 
Jr., the DOC submitted briefs arguing a two-pronged doctrine of 
vicarious liability that squares easily with Simon and the cognitive and 
volitional aspects of "willfulness." Citing People v. Conway,46 the 
DOC argued that a promoter should be vicariously liable for the criminal 
conduct of his staff where he or she: (1) knew or should have known of 
the fraudulent or illegal marketing of securities; and (2) either procured 
or, despite having requisite control, permitted or did nothing to prevent 
the fraudulent or illegal marketing of the securities.47 
Finally, Simon does not affect prosecutions for violations of sections 
other than section 25401. Simon does not overrule or disapprove Clem. 
For the reasons noted herein, the authors are of the opinion that Simon 
44. In a footnote, the court expressly deferred the question of criminal aider and 
abettor liability by stating: 
It is also unnecessary to consider defendant's claim that the court erred in 
instructing the jury that he could be convicted as an aider and abettor on the 
section 2540 I charge. We note for purposes of retrial, however, that petitioner 
appears to have been a principal in the sale of the limited partnership interests. 
The actual salespersons were his agents. If so, it may not be appropriate to 
instruct on aiding and abetting liability. 
Id. at 522 n.19, 886 P.2d at 1291 n.19, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 297 n.19. 
However, as noted supra note 3, the California Supreme Court subsequently dismissed 
the Petition for Review filed by Charles H. Keating, Jr. Keating's petition challenged 
the opinion of the court of appeal finding him criminally liable for the aiding and 
abetting of multiple violations of 25401. People v. Keating, 890 P.2d 1119, 39 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 410 (Cal. 1995). 
45. See, e.g., People v. Miller, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1505, 238 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1987). 
In Miller, the court of appeal upheld a criminal conviction for violating sections 25110 
and 2540 I despite an apparently total lack of contact between Miller and the investors. 
"The parties stipulated [that] Miller never personally met with the investors ... , nor did 
he personally provide them with any information." Id. at 1509 n. 10, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 
170 n.10. The court rejected Miller's argument that "the only person liable" was the 
individual "whose public solicitation garnered the many investors to create his own 
investment pool." Id. at 1509-12; 238 Cal. Rptr. at 170-72. 
46. 42 Cal. App. 3d 875, 117 Cal.Rptr. 251 (1974). 
47. By order dated March 23, 1995, the California Supreme Court dismissed 
Keating' s appeal of his conviction for violations of section 2540 I. Keating, 890 P.2d 
1119, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 410. 
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essentially applies the concept of "willfulness" recognized in Clem to 
prosecutions for the violation of section 25401.48 
IV. How TO LIVE WITH SIMON 
Whether or not Simon was correctly decided, California secunt1es 
regulators and prosecutors must adapt to it and react appropriately. This 
can be done by demonstrating "guilty knowledge" in securities fraud 
prosecutions and by using appropriate points and authorities and jury 
instructions. 
A. "Guilty" Knowledge 
Corresponding roughly to the distinction between "direct" and 
"circumstantial" evidence, the requisite knowledge can be shown either 
by testimony or documents demonstrating actual knowledge or by 
evidence demonstrating inferentially that the individual had to have had 
the requisite knowledge.49 
48. CALJIC 15.26 presents an interesting contrast to section 25401. That 
instruction defines "intent to defraud" as: 
An intent to defraud is an intent to deceive another person for the purpose 
of gaining some material advantage over that person or to induce that person 
to part with property or to alter that person's position to [his] [her] [its] injury 
or risk, and to accomplish that purpose by some false statement, false 
representation of fact, wrongful concealment or suppression of truth, or by any 
other artifice or act designed to deceive. 
2 CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL, supra note 7, No. 15.26 (brackets in 
original). 
Finding an intent to defraud within the meaning of CALJIC 15.26 would appear to 
require more than is required to find a violation of section 25401 after Simon. Section 
25401 will merely require the volitional misrepresentation or omission of material fact, 
with sufficient knowledge and in connection with the offer or sale of a security. In 
contrast, CALJIC 15.26 also focuses on whether there was an intent to alter the victim's 
status, financial or otherwise, and will require a determination that there was an intent 
to defraud the victim to his or her detriment. 
49. CALJIC 2.00 states: 
Evidence consists of testimony of witnesses, writings, material objects, or 
anything presented to the senses and offered to prove the existence or non-
existence of a fact. 
Evidence is either direct or circumstantial. 
Direct evidence is evidence that directly proves a fact, without the necessity 
of an inference. It is evidence which by itself, if found to be true, establishes 
that fact. 
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Two examples are typical of the former category. One is the 
testimony of a mid-echelon "insider," "turned" by the prosecution. 
Another is the memorandum from the defendant to the head of a sales 
force, with attached "pitch sheet," prescribing the sales tactics for the 
"boiler-room" offer of limited partnership interests. 
Without exhausting all possibilities, the latter, inferential, approach 
could be taken by showing that the company was of a comparatively 
small size, that the defendant required all correspondence to be routed 
through his office, that he participated in all major decisions of the 
company, and that a significant majority of the business activity and 
income of the company derived from the fraudulent offer and sale of the 
illegal securities. 
B. Points & Authorities and Jury Instructions 
A slight modification of memoranda of points and authorities and jury 
instructions is essential to a successful prosecution for securities fraud. 
Jury instructions illustrate the point most dramatically. Contrary to those 
given in the Simon trial-and rejected by the California Supreme 
Court--the jury instruction must reflect the requirement that some degree 
of knowledge is essential. Suggested possible instruction(s) would read 
as follows: 
ELEMENTS OF SECTION 2540/ VIOLATION. In order to prove a violation 
of section 25401 the following elements must be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt: 
1. That a security was offered or sold in this state; 
2. That such offer or sale was made by means of a written or oral 
communication; 
3. That such communication either 
a. included an untrue statement of a material fact or facts; or 
b. omitted to state a material fact or facts necessary in order 
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading; 
4. That such conduct was either 
a. knowing; or 
b. of a nature that the promoter should have known that the 
misrepresentation or omission was made and of its misleading character. 
Circumstantial evidence is evidence that, if found to be true, proves a fact 
from which an inference of the existence of another fact may be drawn. 
An inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and reasonably be 
drawn from another fact or group of facts established by the evidence. 
It is not necessary that facts be proved by direct evidence. They may be 
proved also by circumstantial evidence or by a combination of direct evidence 
and circumstantial evidence. Both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence 
are acceptable as a means of proof. Neither is entitled to any greater weight 
than the other. 
I CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL, supra note 7, No. 2.00 
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MATERIALITY. In a prosecution for violation of section 25401, it is 
necessary to show that the defendant knew or should have known that a 
reasonable investor would have wanted to know the misrepresented or omitted 
information before making his investment decision. 
MISREPRESENTATIONS/OMISSIONS. In a prosecution for violation of 
section 25401 it is not necessary to show that the defendant knew that making 
the alleged false statement(s) or omission(s) was against the law. It is only 
necessary to show that the defendant knew or should have known that his 
statement was untrue or omitted information which a "reasonable" investor 
would consider significant in deciding whether to invest. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Criminal prosecutions for securities fraud are still viable. Prosecutors 
will need to prove that the promoter knew or should have known 
pertinent facts. However, this does not require a showing that the 
defendant knew that his false statement or material omission was 
unlawful. In nearly all CSL cases prosecuted since Johnson and 
Baumgart, evidence existed that would have met the Simon standard. 
However, prosecutors chose not to stress the evidence because it was 
deemed unnecessary for a section 25401 conviction. Changing 
memoranda of points and authorities and jury instructions to demonstrate 
the defendant's guilty knowledge will allow prosecutors to continue the 
successful criminal prosecution of securities fraud within the state of 
California. 
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